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FOREWORD
Today’s security environment undoubtedly tests
the boundaries of conventional international and military responses to persistent interstate conflict. New
challenges are continuously emerging that pose vexing dilemmas and question the assumptions of actors
engaged in post-conflict stability operations. Furthermore, recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan suggest that the often-indistinct concept of transition urgently requires a greater collective understanding by
all actors participating in stability operations. As operations move toward a “clear, hold, build, transition”
strategy, a widely accepted and understood definition
is necessary to unite U.S. military, interagency, and
multinational planners to foster greater collaboration
and unity of effort. To evaluate transition strategies
and make recommendations for future stability operations, researchers and policymakers require both a
common understanding and way ahead for advancing the concept as a critical doctrinal and operational
objective.
This monograph offers an unparalleled analysis on
current research and available tools for transition in
post-conflict situations. The authors make a significant
contribution to the field by providing a broadly applicable definition of transition and a comprehensive
assessment of the existing approaches and literature
on the topic. Most importantly, their analysis lays the
groundwork for future conceptual development and
improved implementation of post-conflict transitions.
The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute and the Strategic Studies Institute are pleased to
offer this analysis as a leading article in helping to
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clarify, define, and advance transition as one of the
most critical, but least understood, aspects of stability
operations.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute

STEPHEN T. SMITH
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director
Peacekeeping and Stability
Operations Institute
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SUMMARY
Since the end of the Cold War, members of the international community have undertaken more than
20 major operations to stabilize post-conflict societies,
yielding mixed results. Stability operations are tremendously complex and demand successful direction
of multiple, simultaneous transitions that range from
transforming violent conflict to a sustainable, peaceful environment, to the process of forging sustainable
governing institutions from fragile or nonexistent infrastructure. Yet, the very notion of transition eludes
policymakers, professionals, and scholars because
the concept lacks precise meaning, and its application varies according to context and conditions. At no
other time has understanding transition been more
critical, especially as “clear, hold, build, transition”
becomes the dominant theme for ongoing operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan. Together, professionals and
academics share the challenge and opportunity to
improve how the international community conducts
stability operations—through the comprehensive understanding and implementation of transition.
This monograph addresses the challenging topic
of transition in post-conflict stability operations and
is intended for a wide audience that includes military
and civilian policymakers, international development
experts, and scholars in academe. It is a primer, systematic review, and comprehensive assessment of
the fields of research and practice. From a sample of
more than 170 sources, the monograph presents and
appraises the major lenses (process, authority transfer, phasing, and end state), categories (war-to-peace,
power, societal, political-democratic, security, and
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economic), approaches, and tools under which postconflict transitions are conceived. Considering these
wide and often diverse perspectives, the authors present a holistic definition of transition in the context of
complex stability operations:
Transition is a multi-faceted concept involving the application of tactical, operational, strategic, and international level resources (means) over time in a sovereign
territory to influence institutional and environmental
conditions for achieving and sustaining clear societal
goals (ends), guided by local rights to self-determination and international norms. Transition is inherently
complex, and may include multiple, smaller-scale
transitions that occur simultaneously or sequentially.
These small-scale activities focus on building specific
institutional capacities and creating intermediate conditions that contribute to the realization of long-term
goals.

This monograph lays the groundwork for both future research and greater collaboration among diverse
international and local actors who operate in postconflict environments—specifically to develop a comprehensive definition of transition and adequate tools
to address all facets of the concept. Recommendations
for future research and improved transition policy include a more focused emphasis on areas that include:
• Cross-institutional (political, security, economic)
and multi-level (local, regional, national) studies that explore the interdependencies between
simultaneous transitions;
• Underlying assumptions of current transition
tools and indicators;
• Relationships between transition and institutional resilience; and,
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• T
 hresholds and tipping points between transition phases.
The exploration of the foundations and actual
workings of transition detailed in this monograph
hope to encourage the interagency and multinational
community to provide greater attention to the importance of transition in current operating environments.
This piece is intended to provide the baseline for more
in-depth and relevant analysis.
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HARNESSING POST-CONFLICT TRANSITIONS:
A CONCEPTUAL PRIMER
INTRODUCTION
Today, the United States and members of the international community find themselves wrestling
with the grim dangers—security, economic, and humanitarian—posed by fragile states. Almost 60 fragile states are unable to meet the basic standards for
statehood (Brookings Institute, 2008; Foreign Policy,
2010). Not only do these nations experience difficulties providing their citizens basic civil protections and
services, many suffer from repeating cycles of intrastate conflict. Without question, these problems are
complex, multifaceted, and pervade all aspects of social life. Yet, state fragility is invariably linked to weak
or ineffective political, economic, and societal institutions (Fukuyama, 2004; Ghani & Lockhart, 2008; Paris,
2004; Paris & Sisk, 2009, p. 3; Rotberg, 2004a, 2004b;
van de Walle, 2004).
Given the mixed record of accomplishment of
interventions in recent history, how can the international community improve its efforts to assist in transforming the domestic institutions of fragile states?
Certainly, institution building is a slow, evolutionary,
and transitional process. Accordingly, international
organizations, government agencies, and militaries
have recognized this reality. Yet, one missing, critical
piece is a clearer understanding of transitions in the
context of stability operations. This paper is a modest
attempt toward developing clarity of an often-indistinct concept.
In the last 2 decades, interstate conflict and state
fragility have led to a groundswell of United Nations
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(UN) and U.S.-led interventions (e.g., humanitarian,
peacekeeping, stabilization, and reconstruction operations). Since the end of the Cold War, scholars and
practitioners have drawn together to explore and better understand the nature of these operations and the
challenges facing those tasked to design and implement them. Although contingent on many factors that
range from history and culture to root causes, one
common theme has emerged in these operations: a
fundamental, normative goal of transforming a state
and society in ways that promote sustainable peace,
good governance, and economic prosperity. An expanding body of literature addresses distinct, but
related, research in peace-building and conflict transformation (Berdal, 2009; Dayton & Kriesberg, 2009;
Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Paris, 2004), state-building
(C. Call, Wyeth, & International Peace Institute, 2008;
Fukuyama, 2004; Ghani & Lockhart, 2008; Paris &
Sisk, 2009; Rotberg, 2004b), and stabilization and reconstruction operations (Brinkerhoff, Johnson, & Hill,
2009; Christoff & St. Laurent, 2007; Durch, 2008b;
Englebert & Tull, 2008; Kramer, Megahan, & Gaffney,
2008; Looney, 2008; Szayna et al., 2009; U.S. Department of Defense, 2003; U.S. Department of the Army,
2009a). While many studies and field reports among
these research programs address transition elements,
no attempt has been made to systematically review
the transitional dimensions of stabilization, reconstruction, and peace-building operations as a defined,
holistic concept.
Additionally, practitioners have struggled with
creating a conceptual framework and adequately operationalizing activities inherent to transition. Several
attempts have been made to codify the term by assigning concrete attributes and qualities to transition
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mechanisms, but this has caused much consternation
in the actual application of the term to stability operations. In 2009, the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), based at the U.S. Army War
College, attempted to bridge the gap between policy
and practice by creating a transition definition based
on the insights of domestic and multinational collaborators involved in these operations. The result was a
working definition of the term:
Transition is defined as both a multi-disciplinary process and points of change, in time, when conditions
for stability are achieved in security, justice and reconciliation, infrastructure and economic development,
humanitarian and social well-being, and governance
and reconciliation, through the enabling and empowering of Host Nation Institutions, in order to facilitate
enduring positive effects and improved quality of life
for citizens (Peacekeeping & Stability Operations Institute, 2009).

While there have been substantial efforts to define
transition, its implementation provides an equally
troubling set of problems to practitioners. The fundamental challenge in providing guidance, creating
doctrine, and planning operations is the term’s application to diverse and adapting stability situations.
Each level of interaction in transition—tactical, operational, and strategic—maintains its own vantage
point in regards to the goals, desired outputs/outcomes, and significance in achieving transition. While
the diversity in responses and understanding of the
causes and consequences of transition is appreciated
for dealing with the term’s complexity, this differentiation can cause significant problems in planning and
implementing transition policy at the national level,
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and even significantly complicate collaboration with
interagency and multinational partners. The ambiguity in many of the terms, as well as the differing ways
to interpret and activate them, may cause significant
confusion and setbacks if not defined for all actors involved in the transition process. A better definition of
transition is needed to create a more comprehensive
meaning and better understanding of the term for all
actors engaged in stability operations.
This monograph is a primer on the concept of transition, a systematic review of literature found in both
academic and practitioner circles, and an assessment
on the state of these fields in terms of understanding
transition in stability operations. The authors have
reviewed numerous books, edited volumes, journal
articles, think-tank reports, field experts’ commentary, conference, and workshop proceedings, and
government documents to map the current intellectual landscape on transitions. While this piece draws
upon many foundational texts from peacebuilding,
state-building, and stabilization operations, it is not a
comprehensive review of these subfields, but rather a
focused, targeted appraisal of how research and practice currently address the concept of transition and
transitional aspects of rebuilding fragile states and
societies directly. As a result, it provides a useful contribution to transitional studies to further inform and
guide research and policymaking.
The monograph begins with an attempt to reconcile
the definitional challenges mentioned above and posits a more useful definition of transition in the context
of stability operations. It follows with a detailed literature review and typology of transitions, organized by
the six different forms (or levels) in which transitions
are most typically explored. This is followed by a sur-
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vey of the various approaches and tools that governments (civilian and military agencies) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) currently use in practice
to identify, measure, and assess transition in stability
operations. The authors conclude with an assessment
of the current state of transition literature and provide
recommendations to guide future research and policy
development.
DEFINING “TRANSITION” IN CONTEXT
One of the major challenges of confronting the notion of transition is forming a satisfactory definition.
In common usage, “transition” is defined broadly as
“a passage from one state, stage, subject, or place to
another” or “a movement, development, or evolution from one form, stage, or style to another” (Merriam Webster, 2010). This indicates that transition is
an evolutionary concept. However, without sufficient
context, this definition is too abstract. A useful definition should strike a balance between both abstraction
and reality and complexity and parsimony. Especially
in the field of stability operations, transition can be
defined and operationalized to fit more accurately
the complex issues and problems facing practitioners
creating policies and implementing transition initiatives. To better appreciate the multifaceted nature of
transition, the definition is best explored by honing
in on different qualities of the concept and how these
characteristics interact in the context of stabilization
operations. This section concludes with a working
definition of transition.
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Transition as Process.
For many organizations working in stability operations, transition is defined as a procedural process
that shapes the dynamic environment characterizing
leadership and operational mechanisms (Dubik, 2009;
Hadaway, 2009; Kardos, 2008; Koops & Varwick,
2008; Leika, 2007; Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, 2008a; Schnaubelt, 2009; Serafino, 2009;
U.S. Department of Defense, 2003; U.S. Department of
State - S/CRS, 2005b; U.S. Marine Corps Warfighting
Laboratory, 2008a, 2008b; Walter, 1999). Standard operating procedures (SOPs) and personnel task assignments that characterize transition are often the signature traits of this process, which ultimately define
leadership authorization, tasks, and necessary outputs
for the program and project streams according to the
goals of individual organizations. The interactions between staff participating in transition initiatives shape
the process by creating defined channels and lines of
authority for implementing and overseeing projects. In
many respects, transition processes directly relate to a
“chain of command” structure since defined authority
and responsibilities are outlined throughout program
implementation. Transition actors operate according
to defined steps to meet certain goals, benchmarks,
and outputs that feed into more specific tactical and
operational activities.
The process approach to transition is a mechanism
that provides clear steps to measure progress and
address issues of complexity in stability operations.
Because of their explicitly defined characteristics, the
military is particularly fond of using processes to guide
practitioners through specific applications to achieve
transition. Clear and concise procedures outline the
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activities needed to achieve operational success, and
lead to more long-term outcomes when sequenced correctly. This systematic approach to transition directly
attributes certain inputs with desired outputs in both
the short and long term. By viewing transition as a process, practitioners can shape the responsibilities and
resources needed to accomplish cyclical procedures to
complete transitional processes within defined tactical
and operational goals, specifically through the allocation of responsibilities and oversight. The process approach provides specific guidelines to organize entities to deal with transitional activities.
Transition as Authority Transfer.
Stability operations professionals also view transition as a legitimization of authority when power sharing or transfer takes place (Agüero, 1998; Bellamy &
Williams, 2005; Bertram, 1995; Byman, 2003; Chesterman, 2002; Cliffe, Guggenheim, & Kostner, 2003; Englebert & Tull, 2008; Gow, 2009; Hadaway, 2009; Kotze
& Toit, 1995; Krasner, 2004; Nagl, 2008; Peacekeeping
and Stability Operations Institute, 2006; Swaminathan, 1999; Szayna et al., 2009; U.S. Department of
Defense, 2005a, 2005b, 2007, 2009b; U.S. Department
of State - S/CRS, 2005a, 2005b; U.S. Department of
State, 2009; U.S. Department of the Army, 2009a; U.S.
Institute of Peace (USIP) & U.S. Army Peacekeeping
and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), 2009; U.S.
Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, 2008b). In this
particular model, transition is achieved when a host
nation’s administrative agencies or security forces assume responsibility for specific governmental functions in a post-conflict environment. The transfer of
authority from state building institutions to the host
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nation signals a change in the power relationship
between the entities, and thus constitutes a shift in
how authority will be wielded over key actors in stabilization activities. The U.S. Marine Corps espouses
this authority-based approach to transition in many
of its operational manuals, specifically its 2008 Joint
Urban Warrior exercise: transition is “the process of
shifting the lead responsibility and authority” in order
to achieve larger operational objectives for the organization (U.S. Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory,
2008b, p. 1). The assumption of responsibilities by the
host nation is a key component of measuring success
in transition in several types of stability operations.
However, transition success assumes that the host
nation is both fully capable and willing to carry out
responsibilities previously overseen by intervening
forces. Authority transfer is one of the most prominent strategic indicators for transition in stabilization
operations literature, specifically that related to counterinsurgency operations (a subset within the broader
scope of stability operations).
Transition as Phasing.
Transition can also be thought of as phasing, specifically highlighting the concept’s important relationship with strategic benchmarks and goals (Adekanye,
1997; Avni-Segre, 1969; Barnett, 2006; Bell & Keenan,
2004; Bernabeu, 2007; Byman, 2003; Carothers, 2002a,
2002b; Durch, 2008b; Feng & Zak, 1999; Huth, 1998;
B. Jones, Gowan, & Sherman, 2009; Nixon & Ponzio,
2007; Papagianni, 2009; Ratner, 2009; Riekhoff, 2003;
U.S. Department of Defense, 2009b; U.S. Department
of State - S/CRS, 2005b; U.S. Department of State &
U.S. Department of Defense, 2009; U.S. Department
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of the Army, 2009a, 2009b; USIP & PKSOI, 2009; U.S.
Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, 2008b; Walter, 1999; Wittkopf, 1994; Zinecker, 2009). Transition
phasing is best described as a continuum of activities
that span the political, economic, social, and military
realms of state building over a period, often overlapping and transforming in tandem. Unlike transition
processes, phasing lacks the defined regulations and
procedures that are required to achieve defined tactical and operational objectives.
Phasing, in contrast, highly depends on its environment and responds directly to environmental factors.
Stability operations become defensive in nature when
host nation forces are able to create and maintain stable
structures and functions to ensure the integrity of the
newly developed state. As stability operations shift
from offensive to defensive planning and execution,
certain intermediate “transition points” exist along the
phasing continuum that mark an incremental transfer of resources, authority, and responsibility to host
nation authorities. Often, these “transition points”
are not acknowledged or understood until well after
they have occurred, but they provide benchmarks of
progress to guide future initiatives. Transition, in this
respect, is dynamic in its evolutionary nature and direct response to environmental factors in stabilizing
environments, and can thus be overlooked by both
practitioners and policy planners who become caught
in responding to emerging issues.
Transition phasing greatly informs the many complex changes that occur during stability operations,
specifically at the strategic level. The use of transition
points aids practitioners in pinpointing causal effects
of operational and tactical initiatives, and allows them
to gauge success over the transition continuum (or

9

strategic timeline). Current U.S. Army doctrine grapples with the transition spectrum and codifies key
attributes of the definition for use in operations: “A
transition is not a single event where all activity happens at once. It is a rolling process of little handoffs between different actors along several streams of activities. There are usually multiple transitions for any one
stream of activity over time” (U.S. Department of the
Army, 2009b, p. 52). By noting that transition is an ongoing and insular process, transition must be viewed
as a phased initiative, rather than as a particular tipping point during stability operations. Furthermore,
the input of several streams of activity (better known
as processes) informs the phasing of strategic activities—creating concrete benchmarks at both operational and strategic levels for overall transition success.
Transition as End State.
Transition is also characterized as an end state in
stability operations. Transition as an end state indicates that certain ground conditions are measurably
different than preceding conditions and usually conform with more acceptable standards of governance,
economic stability, and security (Brinkerhoff et al.,
2009; Bush, 2005; Cliffe et al., 2003; Dempsey & Nichols, 2009; Durch, 2008a; Gow, 2009; Kotze & Toit, 1995;
Kramer et al., 2008; Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, 2006, 2008a, 2008b; U.S. Department
of Defense, 2009b; U.S. Department of State - S/CRS,
2005b; U.S. Department of State, 2009; Zielinski, 1999).
In many respects, host nations transitioning to more
legitimized and internationally acceptable norms are
the ultimate goal for intervention actors. Transition
that strengthens legitimate governing capacity and
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societal institutions is the target goal for stability operations, especially since it ensures the establishment
of viable and credible governed states. End state structures add to the strategic value of stability outcomes,
most notably by fostering host nation compliance with
international norms and standards.
Transition as end state is increasingly used by
agencies and organizations searching for success
benchmarks in operational activities. By defining a
particular event or tangible result—usually related
to authority and responsibility transfer—as a benchmark, stability operations actors are able to better
gauge mission effectiveness and accomplishment of
tactical and operational goals. As such, end states subsume process, authority transfer, and phasing aspects
of transition.
Using Context to “Define” Transition.
The various ways of viewing transition outlined
above should be considered in reaching an appropriate definition of the concept. Yet, despite the current
discussion about transition, no single definition exists that encompasses its complexity. Even the most
proactive institutions in transition activities have been
unable to produce a conceptual framework to guide
practitioners in grappling with the complex and multidimensional dilemmas inherent to transition. Several different working documents on transition exist
to guide practitioners in the field, but few have similar
concepts that cross organizational and functional lines
to provide a holistic and multidisciplinary meaning.
The most encompassing transition definition
is found in the U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-07,
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Stability Operations. In this manual, the military pulls
together all the concepts outlined in this paper:
Transitions mark a change of focus between phases
or between the ongoing operation and execution of a
branch or sequel. The shift in relative priority between
the elements of full spectrum operations—such as
from offense to stability—also involves a transition . . .
transition between phases. . . . Stability operations include transitions of authority and control among military forces, civilian agencies and organizations, and
the host nation. Each transition involves inherent risk.
That risk is amplified when multiple transitions must
be managed simultaneously or when the force must
conduct a series of transitions quickly. . . . Transitions
are identified as decisive points on lines of effort; they
typically make a significant shift in effort and signify
the gradual return to civilian oversight and control of
the host nation (U.S. Department of the Army, 2009a,
p. 80).

The definition found in FM 3-07 is a good starting
point for defining transition, but does not fully encompass all of the caveats discussed in this monograph. In
many respects, the U.S. Army transition definition is
purely kinetic, focusing exclusively on transition process and phasing in lieu of its occasionally static properties. End states and authority transfers are missing
in the field manual, but these concepts must be included to fully understand transition’s complexity. A
more comprehensive approach to transition must be
addressed and embraced by academics and practitioners for a more comprehensive understanding of the
term.
In light of the concepts and activities defining transition, a single definition is needed to further explore
the conceptual frameworks of the term, more fully

12

comprehend its complexity, and apply it to different
transition situations. For the purpose of this paper,
transition will be defined as follows:
Transition is the multi-faceted application of tactical, operational, strategic, and international level resources (means) over time in a sovereign territory to
influence institutional and environmental conditions
for achieving and sustaining clear societal goals and
legitimate statehood (ends), guided by local rights to
self-determination and international norms. Transition is inherently complex, and may include multiple,
smaller-scale transitions that occur simultaneously
or sequentially. These small-scale activities focus on
building specific institutional capacities and creating
intermediate conditions that contribute to the realization of long-term goals.

The definition remains broad in order to provide
wide application and analytical flexibility for both
scholars and practitioners addressing transitional issues. It is neutral to all actors (i.e., military, civilian,
local, and international) involved in transition, and it
incorporates local and international norms as part of
transitional activities. By using the definition above,
several types, or combinations, of transition can be
better understood and addressed.
TYPES OF TRANSITION
The extant literature on transition is significantly
broad in scope and reflective of the difficulties surrounding its definition, described above. What exactly is to be transitioned? From what pre-condition
to what post-condition? Conceptual ambiguity can

13

potentially lead to miscommunication and complicate
analysis, particularly for comparative analysis. Part of
this challenge lies in specifying the object of transition,
be it a major conflict, political system, institution, or
society. While authors do not always explicitly state
the “type” of transition in their work, the context and
level(s) of institutional analysis do provide an indication of the type(s) of transition under examination.
This section lays out the various objects, or types, of
transition found in the literature.
It is worth noting, however, that the act of categorizing transitions into ideal types reveals layers
of complexity. In the context of stabilization and reconstruction operations, transitions actually proceed
on multiple levels simultaneously. For instance, postconflict societal transitions aimed at reconciliation and
conflict resolution typically occur alongside major
political transitions (i.e., institutional reforms, elections). Further complicating matters are the interdependencies between types of transitions. For example,
the transition from a tightly-controlled economy to a
free-market system requires the protection of property rights—made possible only through an effective
security sector and judicial system. If these sectors are
transitioning as well, but inadequate to provide the
conditions necessary for economic growth, the economic transition may stall. Transitional interdependencies naturally lead to questions over timing and
sequence.
Altogether, six types of transition emerge from
the literature: war-to-peace, power, societal, politicaldemocratic, security, and economic. Some scholars collapse these categories. Charles-Phillipe David (1999)
describes stability and peacebuilding activities as the
combination of three overarching transitions: security,
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democratic, and socio-economic. Parsimony is a sensible objective, yet due to the extent of literature falling across these institutional categories and that this
is a review of existing studies, it is important, for this
paper at least, to outline the extent to which authors
characterize and examine the concept of transition.
We also recognize that these classifications overlap—particularly political and democratic transitions.
A democratic transition is surely a political transition,
but not necessarily the other way around. Yet, Roland
Paris’ (1997) influential argument for “institutionalization before liberalization” directly challenges the
idea that, from the very outset, interventions must
be designed with democratic goals in mind. Such a
distinction from non- and/or quasi-democratic transitions is essential to understanding which forms of
government are most likely to succeed in different environments. The diagram below provides a basic, but
useful, visualization of how the various types of transitions explored in the literature relate to each other.
Each transition type is described in further detail in
the following section.
War-to-Peace Transitions.
War-to-peace transitions are the broadest form of
transition because they encompass both interstate and
intrastate conflict and range in scope across global, regional, and domestic levels of analysis. In addition to
traditional nation-states, international organizations
like the UN, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), and the World Bank are noted as critical actors in war-to-peace transitions (Bellamy & Williams,
2005; Campbell, 2008; Cliffe et al., 2003; Durch, 2008a,
2008b; Dzinesa, 2004; B. Jones et al., 2009; Ripsman,
2005).
15

On a global, interstate level, war-to-peace transitions describe changes in the international system,
mainly with respect to the relations between nationstates and international organizations. Wittkopf (1994)
characterizes the changes in the international system
in the wake of the Cold War, such as the fall of the Berlin Wall, as an element of a war-to-peace transition,
while noting that contrasting foreign policy beliefs
(cooperative versus militant internationalism) tend to
lag behind systemic changes.
Regional war-to-peace transitions center on the
stability of specific regions around the globe, such as
Europe after World War II, post-colonial Africa, and
the Middle East. These studies range from exploring
war-to-peace transitions in stable and unstable regions
of the world and the influence of cooperation and
competition between major state powers on peaceful
outcomes (Miller, 2001) to investigating international
organizations and the connection between the recent
regionalization of UN peacekeeping interventions
and its impact on both global and regional security
(Bellamy & Williams, 2005). Ripsman (2005) uses a
combined approach, concluding that regions stabilize
over time due to a mix of both realist mechanisms
(e.g., great international powers, common threats) and
liberal mechanisms (e.g., democratic political regimes
and cooperative international institutions).
Intrastate war-to-peace transitions are predominantly considered in terms of both domestic conflict
resolution and peace processes, and reconstruction
and development efforts. While part of a much larger
body of literature on peacebuilding, designing peaceful transitions begins with the development and implementation of credible commitments to peace between
belligerent factions (Walter, 1999). Both state and
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nonstate intermediaries play a role in the constructive
management of intrastate conflicts and peace processes, but the extent of their influence remains unknown
due to a research deficiency in actor relationships and
stability outcomes (Dayton, 2009). Moreover, human
rights NGOs typically face many challenges, which
change in form over time from overt violence to tactics
of intimidation and marginalization as nations transition away from conflict (Bell & Keenan, 2004).
Peacebuilding and conflict transformation are undoubtedly difficult in practice. Maney et al. (2006) provide a valuable examination of the breakdowns of the
Oslo, Norway, and Belfast, Ireland, Good Friday peace
talks and the importance of participant empowerment,
grass-roots legitimacy, and coping with “spoilers” (see
also Menkhaus, 2006; Stedman, 1997) in achieving an
agreement and, ultimately, a peaceful transition. Corruption is also a major challenge to peacebuilding and
one factor that requires greater depth of research (Le
Billon, 2008). Political and economic motives of belligerents (Muggah & Krause, 2009) and organizational
characteristics, such as structural features, ideologies,
relationships with other organizations, and attachments to violence (Kriesberg & Millar, 2009), influence whether or not competing groups choose strategies that foster peace consolidation. Leadership styles
also play a role in the collective decisions of groups
to engage in violence or peaceful political processes
(Hermann & Gerard, 2009). Both Cliffe et al. (2003)
and Atashi (2009) note the importance of combining
bottom-up and top-down approaches to ensure the
sustainability of peace processes and development.
In addition to formal peace processes, demilitarization of military-dominated regimes and the disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating (DDR) of
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combatants into society are critical aspects of warto-peace transitions (David, 1999; Lyons, 2009). The
prevention of criminal violence and a “climate of impunity” is critical in the time immediately following a
peace agreement (Berdal, 2009). Lyons claims that “for
a successful, sustainable transition from war to peace,
the warring parties need to demobilize and create new,
accountable security forces” (2009, p. 100). These key
tasks thus serve as an important link to, and overlap
with, security transitions, particularly security sector
reform (below).
Power Transitions.
While war-to-peace transitions are defined broadly and vary based on the level of analysis (global,
regional, and domestic), power transitions pertain
to the relative change of power among states in the
international system. This is not to be confused with
the concept of power relations in domestic politics,
which is subsumed within the institutional-specific
transitions below. Classic balance of power theory
and neo-realism (Waltz, 1979) are two closely related
preconceptions in the field of international relations
that rest on a substantial body of literature, well beyond the scope of this review. However, the few studies that address power transitions center on power
relations as predictors of interstate war (Chan, 2004;
De Soysa, Oneal, & Park, 1997) and the likelihood of
stability and order during peaceful power transitions
from declining to rising global powers (Kupchan, Davidson, & Sucharov, 2001). Scholars have also used the
terms “security transition” and “security transformation” in the context of geopolitics, explaining changes
in the foreign and security policies of states relative to
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domestic political and social change and power shifts
in the international system (Riekhoff, 2003).
It is important to note here that, to an extent, power transitions are tangential to the study of intrastate
transitions due to their exclusion of domestic political and societal issues. However, for the sake of this
review and for clarity, a power transition is a type of
transition found in the peace and security studies literature and one that researchers should be mindful of
in relation to other forms of transition.
Societal Transitions.
Generally stated, societal transitions are the transformations of relationships and rules of interaction
among people and groups in a given society. Implicit
in this type of transition is the normative goal of peace;
thus, it shares significant overlap with war-to-peace
transitions on the intrastate level mentioned above.
As a distinct category, societal transition diverges
from the broader war-to-peace transitions by focusing
heavily on humanitarian action and the development
of civil society, or community-oriented groups and
institutions that provide additional public goods outside the control of the state.
Reconstruction and development of a post-conflict
civil society entails the strengthening of organizations
and institutions that foster social cooperation and improve quality of life (David, 1999; Posner, 2004). In
post-conflict societies, civil society groups perform
a substitution role by providing critical services in
place of a weakened, transitional state (Posner, 2004).
“During transitions, they tend to be especially prominent, either because of their ability to control or mobilize masses of people, or because they are able to fill

19

policy voids through expertise” (Cawthra & Luckham,
2003a, p. 313). More important to societal transition is
the very creation of social groups, regardless of their
function, as trust and norms of reciprocity (e.g., social
capital) are the byproduct of successful cooperation
over time (Posner, 2004).
This can be extremely difficult, particularly in
societies that lack a cohesive identity (Byman, 2003).
Yet, as previously mentioned, challenges also emerge
when development projects are not inclusive of local
input or designed to ensure long-term local engagement and ownership (Cliffe et al., 2003; Kramer et
al., 2008). Furthermore, and despite these efforts and
good intentions, relief programs have an historical
propensity to inadvertently create local dependencies
on foreign assistance (David, 1999), or undermine the
legitimacy of reconstructed government institutions
(Narten, 2009).
For development practitioners, cultural competence is a critical element for effectively building
social capital and conditions of local empowerment
and ownership, all of which facilitate societal transition. Rubinstein et al. (2008) provides seven principles
of action for peacekeepers to better understand and
use culture to increase success: (1) an awareness to
interpret meaning and interact in a culturally positive manner; (2) attentiveness to cultural symbols
(i.e., colors, birds, plants); (3) avoiding assumptions
that locals share the similar motives; (4) awareness of
any differences in local conflict management practices
from international norms; (5) strong emphasis on ensuring mutual expectations are explicitly understood
by locals and peacekeepers; (6) avoiding displays of
partiality towards different social groups; and (7) an
informed understanding of the hierarchies of power,
influence, and expertise in a given community.
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Political and Democratic Transitions.
Quite possibly the largest body of work on transitions, political and democratic transitions pertain to
the process of transformation and/or (re)construction
of formal institutions of the state from one regime type
to another. In fact, the study of democratic transitions
that occurred during the second half of the 20th century is commonly referred to as the “transition paradigm” (Carothers, 2002a) and remains an established
topic in the field of comparative politics.
Political and democratic transitions take place in
a variety of forms. They can occur internally through
violent uprisings, coups d’état, and revolutions or
peaceful negotiations, or, as seen in recent years,
through intervention by the international community.
Transitional arenas of reform in political and democratic transitions include decisions on new constitutions, electoral systems, structures of governance (e.g.,
unitary versus federalist), new political elites and the
reallocation of power, security sector, justice and rule
of law, reconciliation and restitution of past injustices,
and the media sector (Agüero, 1998; Bernabeu, 2007;
Brinkerhoff et al., 2009; Byman, 2003; Welsh, 1994).
NGOs providing democracy assistance on local levels play an important role in supporting democratic
transitions (Mendelson, 2001). Admitting that there
are variations in speeds of transition at different levels
(national down to the individual), Welsh (p. 381) describes five characteristics that pertain to all political
and democratic transitions: (1) an urgent need to address issues of major concern, (2) a great deal of uncertainty in both process and outcome, (3) conflict over the
methods and procedures for changing authoritarian
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structures, (4) elite-centered decisionmaking over
transitional processes, and (5) negotiation.
We point out that there is a distinction between a
political transition and a democratic transition. A political transition is more general, pertaining to changes
in regime type, institutional structure, and/or policies
(usually, but not always, away from authoritarianism), whereas a democratic transition is a specific process of political and institutional liberalization with
a more definitive end-state. Studies on political transitions tend to examine transformations of political
institutions and processes in relation to other institutions such as the military, civil society, and economy,
but not necessarily democratization or liberal reforms.
Welsh (1994, p. 381) makes this clear, stating “whereas
liberalization is a controlled opening of the political
space, democratization—that is, extrication from the
authoritarian regime and constitution of a democratic
one—is a process that subjects different interests to
competition.”
Part of the difficulty of parsing out distinctions
between political and democratic transformations is
that earlier scholars make the assumption that any
country moving away from authoritarianism is transitioning toward democracy (Huntington, 1991; G. A.
O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986; G. A. O’Donnell, Schmitter, & Whitehead, 1986; Schmitter, 1995). Much of the
research focused on explaining why and how roughly
30 countries initiated a “third wave of democratization” from approximately 1974 to 1990 (Huntington,
1991). Schmitter (1995, pp. 541, 562) provides a very
useful representation of regime change from authoritarian rule to democracy noting four necessary processes with variable timing to achieve democratic consolidation:
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(1) the formation of a party system;
(2)the formation of an interest association
system;
(3) drafting and approval of a constitution; and,
(4) submission of the military to civilian control.
He also notes six key events whose occurrences
(sequence) are unpredictable during democratic transition:
(1) “the formation of a provisional government;
(2) the negotiation of a pact of military extraction from power;
(3) the imposition of changes in the structure of
property;
(4) the negotiation of a pact among political
parties;
(5) the negotiation of a social pact with the participation of interest associations; and,
(6) the revision of the territorial distribution of
power.” (p. 563)
Schmitter’s theoretical work on democratic transitions is perhaps the most relevant literature toward
a more sophisticated understanding of transitions in
stability operations.
However, the incompleteness of some of these
transitions and weak performance of these new democracies have led some scholars to challenge this
core assumption and debate the very utility of the
“transition paradigm” (Carothers, 2002a, 2002b; Hyman, 2002; Nodia, 2002; G. O’Donnell, 2002; Wollack,
2002).
Casting further doubt, it is noted more recently that
“the average time required to transit the path from
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extreme autocracy to coherent, albeit precarious, democracy has been 50 years, and only two have managed this transition in fewer than 25 years” (Moon,
2009, p. 115). There is also a strong correlation between
democratic transitions and conflict and instability,
due in part by societal mistrust and fear of exercising
democratic freedoms in the absence of adequate security and strong democratic institutions (Byman, 2003).
Domestic Political Transitions. As mentioned above,
political transitions occur both internally through
peaceful or coercive means and externally through
interstate warfare and internationally led interventions. Many of the earlier studies (1945-90) on political
and democratic transitions fall into the former category, focusing on internal transitions in Europe, Latin
America, South Asia, and the Middle East. The “third
wave” has been attributed to a lag in development of
political institutions rather than social and economic
institutions (Huntington, 1968, p. 5).
Several scholars have provided theoretical accounts on phases, processes, and modes of democratization. Dankwart Rustow (1970) describes democratic
transitions evolving along three phases: a preparatory
phase that entails deep divisions between political actors, a decision phase that formally institutionalizes
specific democratic procedures, and a final habituation phase in which political actors and the public
adjust to new rules. Carothers (2002a, p. 7) highlights
three processes central to democratization: “opening,”
a period of democratic tumult and divisions within
the authoritarian political regime; “breakthrough,”
the collapse of the authoritarian regime and the emergence of democratic institutions, elections, and constitutional reforms; and “consolidation,” a slow period
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of institutionalization and accumulation of democratic
substance as society and politics adjust to new democratic rules. Huntington offers three different modes
of democratization:
Transformation . . . occurred when the elites in power
took the lead in bringing about democracy. Replacement . . . occurred when opposition groups took the
lead in bringing about democracy, and the authoritarian regime collapsed or was overthrown . . . transplacement . . . occurred when democratization resulted
largely from joint action by government and opposition groups (1991, p. 114).

While these theories are helpful in describing the
phases, processes, and mode of transition to democracy, it is important to note that some, if not many, of
these democratic transitions have been half-measures.
Indeed, semi-transitioned states have come to be
known as “hybrid regimes” (Diamond, 2002; Zinecker, 2009) and, as such, researchers should be mindful
to make careful distinctions between the political elite
who maintain the locus of power and formal state institutions (Fishman, 1990). Schedler (2002) argues that
free elections are hardly a sufficient qualifier for inclusion, pointing out how elites can manipulate elections to display a veneer of democratic governance.
Similarly, Cook (2007) highlights how the militarydominated regimes in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey use
“pseudo-democratic” institutions to present a public
façade of democratic norms and outlet for societal disputation while disguising and protecting their own
elite interests and control over the existing political
order.
Worse yet, some seemingly democratic transitions
lapse back into periods of instability. The reasons
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why some democratic transitions end in violence are
largely subjective. Zielinski (1999) cites that violence
in these circumstances is triggered by miscommunication within the government rather than the resistance of the opposition. However, Huntington makes
a strong proposition that “the stability of any given
polity depends upon the relationship between the
level of political participation and the level of political institutionalization” (Huntington, 1968, p. 79). In
other words, as a society becomes more politically active (less oligarchic or elite-centric), the more a state’s
political institutions must be effective at channeling
public participation to maintain a stable political order. The importance here is Huntington’s emphasis on
linking institutionalization with stability.
Externally Assisted/Imposed Political Transitions.
Externally assisted or imposed political transitions
typically occur in the midst of extreme conflict and/
or a state’s failure to provide basic governance to its
citizens. Structural conditions of ineffective, illegitimate governance and poor security not only provide
fuel for conflict, but also serve as breeding grounds
for illicit activities that can potentially threaten the
international order, thus increasing the likelihood of
outside intervention (S. G. Jones, 2008). Depending on
the scope of the operation, actors involved, and stated
goals, these interventions are often given labels like
nation-building, state-building, post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction operations, conflict transformation, peace operations, peacekeeping, and liberal
peacebuilding (C. T. Call & Cousens, 2007). These operations are typically large, complex, and are conducted in concert with other simultaneous transitions
(i.e., security transitions, war-to-peace transitions).

26

They also typically involve a transitional administration which provides a temporary governing mechanism before a host nation government is put in place
to authorize state activities. Large, UN-led operations
(i.e., Timor Leste) often carry mandates to temporarily
exercise sovereign powers until the host nation builds
the requisite security and administrative conditions
needed for sustainable development (Chesterman,
2002). Operational phases for transitional administrations overlap and include restoring peace and security, establishing conditions for self-rule, providing
development assistance, and transferring the day-today operations of governance over to local authority.
“These are not necessarily sequential phases, nor are
they mutually exclusive, but they do represent discrete
aspects of a transitional administration” (Chesterman,
2002, p. 72). Chesterman also makes an important
point that not enough serious research has been conducted on when and how sovereign power should be
transferred to local hands.
Given recent experience, both scholars and experts
are acutely aware of the complexities associated with
externally-driven political transitions. Imperatives for
operations include a clear political end-state and timeframe established by all parties; sufficient time to plan,
resource, train personnel, and establish local credibility; and a flexible mandate to adjust to changing
local conditions (Chesterman, 2002). However, these
operations are fraught with flawed assumptions, dilemmas, and challenges such as the notion that Western political institutions can be transplanted in nonWestern states (such as post-World War II Germany;
see Sa’adah, 2006), that locals and political elites share
their benign understanding and desires for reconstruction, and that reconstruction is actually within their
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means, and have often led to failure, particularly in
Africa (Englebert & Tull, 2008). David (1999, pp. 33-34)
cites more pitfalls of externally led political interventions noting that introducing democratic competition
can be destabilizing in societies without a long tradition of civic-participation; redistributions of power
between groups in conflict can create tensions where
democracy’s shortcomings become fuel for groups to
advance political blame games (see also Byman, 2003);
and that the implementation of a democratic election
does not automatically create democracy (e.g., Fareed
Zakaria’s “illiberal democracy”).
Other Considerations. Some evidence suggests that
liberal peacebuilding actually contributes to conflict
rather than promoting peace and democratic governance. An argument based in recent experience, but
closely related to that put forth in Samuel Huntington’s Political Order in Changing Societies (1968), is Roland Paris’ “institutionalization before liberalization”
thesis that democratic reforms will not succeed in a
state without strong institutions preceding this process (Paris, 1997, 2004; Paris & Sisk, 2009). An alternative is “republican peacebuilding” which centers on
principles of deliberation, constitutionalism, and representation that helps lay the institutional foundations
for follow-on liberal political reforms (Barnett, 2006).
A more recent study highlights tensions between
building strong democratic institutions at national
and local levels in Afghanistan and reiterates the need
for an integrated state-building approach (Nixon &
Ponzio, 2007). Papagianni (2009) heeds Roland Paris’
argument that strong institutions are necessary before
political liberalization, but insists, nevertheless, that
political participation and inclusion of belligerents in
transitional outcomes is still possible and warranted.
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Questions over sovereignty become major obstacles to political transitions (Bertram, 1995). Krasner
(2004) challenges the conventional wisdom that governance assistance and transitional administrations
are the best models for failing states, stating that they
are often ineffective. Instead, he calls for power sharing arrangements such as trusteeships or shared sovereignty agreements with international organizations
or more stable states to ensure that state stability is
overseen. However, Kosovo, as an exception, is an
ongoing case of a transition in flux because the UNmandated transitional administration assumed responsibility for exercising sovereign rule that created
a problem of local ownership (Gow, 2009). Others simply call for scholars and the international community
to accept the fact that the great majority of transitional
countries are somewhere in between authoritarianism
and democracy, asserting that teleological, ideal-type
democracy is no longer realistic (Carothers, 2002a).
Methods. The literature on political and democratic
transitions contains a diverse panoply of research
methods (quantitative and qualitative) beyond the
standard case study approach. Przeworski (1991) classifies studies on political and democratic transitions
into two groups: macro-studies that center on overarching, objective, and structural conditions of political transition, and studies on political strategy and
choice. A significant majority of this research consists
of inductive case studies. However, scholars have also
applied empirical and formal modeling techniques to
explore both elements of structure and agency. These
studies tend to align along one of two theses: the modernization thesis that posits democratic transitions result from economic development and modernization,
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and the political agent thesis that makes the claim that
democratic transitions are the result of strategic interactions among political actors (Kugler & Feng, 1999).
Focusing largely on structural conditions, a small
handful of studies apply econometric models to democratic transitions (Feng & Zak, 1999; Ratner, 2009; Ulfelder & Lustik, 2005; Zak & Feng, 2003). These explore
the socio-economic determinants of transition, citing
that factors such as low education, income inequality,
and a weak democratic heritage are statistically linked
to failed or stalled transitions (Feng & Zak, 1999). Zak
and Feng (2003) integrate the dynamics between political transition and economic development, citing that
additional factors such as the growth and distribution
of economic development, authoritarian policies, and
legitimacy determine if and when transitions occur.
Ulfelder and Lustik (2005) implement a model of transition that shows significant results on factors such as
civil liberties and resource rents, or extra economic
profits from natural resources. Other tools applied
include factor analysis (Kotze & Toit, 1995) and spatial analysis (Lin, Chu, & Hinich, 1996). Taking a more
international approach, Ratner (2009) uses regression
analysis to explore the connection between democratic transition and foreign policy alignment along U.S.
goals. Starr and Lindborg (2003) study the impact of
diffusion on the rise in democratic transitions across
the international system from 1974 to 1996.
Scholars in the latter category tend to turn to rational choice and game-theoretical models to better
understand why some democratic transitions end in
violence and others are pursued peacefully. Rational
choice and game theory examine the strategic nature
of the decision of an authoritarian regime to pursue
a transition toward liberalization. Przeworski (1991)
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was one of the first to use basic game-theoretical models to explain transition processes as signaling behavior between the regime and opposition groups. Subsequent models integrate the element of uncertainty
in the transition outcome (Crescenzi, 1999; Gates &
Humes, 1997). Swaminathan (1999) specifies a timing
game to highlight the significance of relative power
distributions as indicators that can predict when opposition groups mobilize and when negotiations will
take place. Wantchekon (1999) explores the strategic
choices of voters and the likelihood of violence in the
wake of a transitional state’s first democratic election.
Security Transitions.
In the outset of a conflict intervention, the first priority is security. Initially provided by a stabilization
force, the establishment of a safe and secure environment is central to sustainable peace and development
(Brzoska, 2003, 2007; Jean, 2005; McFate, 2008; Meharg,
Arnush, & Merrill, 2010; Schnabel & Ehrhart, 2005;
U.S. Agency for International Development [USAID],
U.S. Department of Defense, & U.S. Department of
State, 2009). Yet, in time, the responsibility for maintaining security must be transferred back to the host
nation—ideally under democratic civilian control—at
a time when it holds the sovereign capacity to preserve security through a legitimate monopoly on the
use of force (Bruneau & Tollefson, 2006; Cawthra &
Luckham, 2003a, 2003b; Huntington, 1957; Luckham,
2003; U.S. Agency for International Development
[USAID] et al., 2009). The security sector “plays an
important and indispensible role in helping post-conflict societies secure a transition to a more productive
and peaceful life” (Ehrhart & Schnabel, 2005, p. 320).
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Accordingly, a security transition is the turbulent process from a condition of insecurity to one of stability
with legitimate host nation control over an effective
security sector. This can occur internally, as a state’s
political and coercive institutions (e.g., armed forces
and police) build sufficient capacity to provide a safe
and secure environment, or with external support
through international peacekeeping forces, security
sector reform, and security force assistance programs.
Security transitions are broad in scope, complex,
lengthy, and require a vast array of resources (human,
institutional, and financial). Brzoska notes that the
overarching post-conflict security transition agenda
consists of a focus on the “prevention of renewed conflict, establishment of rule of law, democratization,
and sustainable development . . . all [of which fall]
eventually under full domestic ‘ownership’” (2007, p.
i). Citing South Africa as an ideal type of a successful
security transition, Cawthra and Luckham note the actual sequence of reforms as (2003a, p. 308):
1. The lifting of repressive security legislation;
2. The reform of the police service to ensure that
the political process can be freed up; and,
3. Reform of the defense forces.
It is important to observe that despite the literature’s contemporary emphasis on security transitions as internationally led security reform, many of
the prescriptive concepts, such as civilian control of
the armed forces and professionalization of the officer corps, are grounded in the subfield of comparative civil-military relations (Bruneau & Tollefson,
2006; Cook, 2007; Feaver, 2003; Huntington, 1957,
1968; Janowitz, 1960; Taylor, 2003). Samuel Huntington’s Political Order in Changing Societies (1968) is a
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particularly relevant text to the study of multilevel
transitions. He makes a strong case that a nation’s stability is determined by the balance between the capacity of political institutions and the degree of a society’s
demand for participation in the political activities of
the state. As societies move from oligarchic political systems toward democratic systems and demand
more political participation, political institutions must
adapt in order to channel participation in a way that
stymies instability, or worse, military intervention in
politics (e.g., a coup d’état).
Security transitions are critically linked to other domestic-level transitions (war-to-peace, political-democratic, societal, and economic) as security, on a basic
level, provides a necessary, but insufficient, condition
through which other transitions occur. “It is argued
that the policy choices made about the management
and control of military and security forces at moments
of crisis or transition . . . are decisive for the consolidation of democracy, the prevention of conflict and the
building of a sustainable peace” (Luckham, 2003, p.
3). Moreover, its connection to democratic transition
is particularly strong due to the close proximity between security institutions and political power as well
as the capacity of security institutions to manage any
negative consequences of democratization (Cawthra
& Luckham, 2003a, p. 305).
This claim has its limits, however. While security
sector reconstruction and reform can enhance domestic administrative capacity and legitimacy, it does not
necessarily mean it alone will impel regime change or
democratic consolidation (Brzoska, 2007, p. vi). Nor
do democratic transitions necessarily drive security
reform. While much of the literature on democratic
transitions suggests that free elections, transparency,
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and accountability should lead to greater civilian control, justice, and human rights protections, the emergence of hybrid regimes and illiberal democracies
show that this is not necessarily the case (Cook, 2007;
Diamond, 2002; Zinecker, 2009). A great deal of the
literature on security sector reform centers on objective goals and recommendations for implementation;
much less thought has been given to the impacts of
the economic and political circumstances of Security
Sector Reform (SSR) outcomes (Luckham, 2003, p. 17).
We cannot overstate the fact that the strengths and
directions of interdependence among these different
forms of transition are underexplored and ripe for future research.
In light of the broad security transition agenda, the
literature tends to focus specifically on two dominant
subthemes: the (re)construction of security institutions
(i.e., military, police, intelligence, courts) to achieve a
legitimate monopoly of force, and the reform of these
institutions to achieve normative goals of civilian
oversight and the protection of basic human rights
(Luckham, 2003). These distinct, but closely related,
aspects are typically conflated by the oft-used terms
“security sector reform,” “security sector reform and
reconstruction,” and “security sector transformation.”
Military and law enforcement experts who help train
and equip security forces distinguish their functional
role as different from the broader security sector reform mission, labeling it “security force assistance”
(Dubik, 2009). Vagueness aside, security sector reform
“is essential in the transition from war to peace in
conflict-afflicted countries” (McFate, 2008, p. 1). Definitions of security sector reform include the following:
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the complex task of transforming the institutions and
organizations that deal directly with security threats
to the state and its citizens (McFate, 2008, p. 2).
the set of policies, plans, programs, and activities that
a government undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice . . . [with] the overall
objective is to provide these services in a way that promotes an effective and legitimate public service that
is transparent, accountable to civilian authority, and
responsive to the needs of the public (U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) et al., 2009, p. 2).

U.S. Army Lieutenant General James Dubik makes
a point to emphasize that security transitions should
not be viewed as the simple authority transfer to the
host nation government to train and equip security
forces. Rather, it is the dual process of creating a security enterprise that combines both security force assistance (training and equipping military and police
forces) with SSR, or the institutional development of
the administrative agencies that provide oversight of
the security sector (Dubik, 2009).
Challenges and Strategies. Experts in the field have
provided critical insight into implementation challenges and strategies for transition unknowingly.
There are many factors for consideration in evaluating
the potential for transition success. First, the relative
balance between belligerent forces is a structural consideration for security transition. David (1999, p. 30)
notes that the closer an interstate conflict resembles a
civil war the “more resistant it is to a peaceful settlement.” “A realistic strategy for peacebuilding must
take into account the fact that the balance of forces may
have a greater bearing on the chances for a peaceful
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security transition than does a negotiated agreement”
(p. 31). Second, effects of the security dilemma on
ex-combatants, particularly lack of trust, introduces
uncertainty. Third, control and final resolution over
territory is also a contentious issue for security transitions, especially after civil war; evidence suggests that
arbitrary separation of belligerents and division of
territory does not often work to sustain peace (p. 32).
Fourth, corruption, often pervasive in post-conflict
societies, gives cause for great concern in the process
of rebuilding security forces. For example, substandard conditions and weak accountability procedures
aid criminal and insurgent groups in obtaining arms
(Dickey, 2007). Fifth, the resilience and competing
legitimacy of informal institutions creates confusion
and difficulty for institution building. Locals in fragile
states view the parallel or informal institutions as legitimate proxies for security and governance, making
it difficult to build legitimacy for newly created stated
institutions (David, 1999). Finally, old “institutional
and ideational legacies of military power” can also be
either a hindrance to or facilitate security reforms and
transition (Golts & Putnam, 2004). Long-lasting societal attitudes (positive or negative) toward military
forces, the degree to which people view their military
as a symbol of national pride and prestige, and the degree of operational autonomy that old security establishments use to help can be seen as factors influencing the ultimate success of a security transition (Golts
& Putnam, 2004).
In terms of security force assistance, the reality of
the security situation places a heavy demand on the
rapid development of security forces. Dubik (2009)
notes that the quantity versus quality argument over
security force development is a futile debate as neither
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are individually sufficient strategies. Quantity alone
will not result in security; likewise, a focus on quality
will take too long to develop adequate security forces
and result in a strategic defeat for external actors in
the short term. Instead, he argues, in the case of Iraq a
focus on “sufficiency” is the appropriate guideline and
a first order task for security force trainers to define at
the outset of such a mission. It has also been observed
that rebuilding effective police forces is as important
(if not more important) than building military forces
to maintain security (S. G. Jones, 2008).
Strengthening linkages between national, regional,
and local institutions is critical to building capacity and
resilience. Experts highlight a multilevel “circuit-rider
approach” (the deployment of advisor teams that rotate to different locations to provide on-site technical
assistance) to advising courts and justices as an effective tool for strengthening judicial systems (Dempsey
& Nichols, 2009). A circuit-rider approach refers to assistance and training. However, some have called for
permanently institutionalizing security force training
and assistance functions within the U.S. Army in the
form of an “Advisor Command,” which would create
a specialized cadre of military personnel to oversee
the training of host nation officials (Nagl, 2008).
Finally, timelines and expectations are also important considerations in determining time horizons
for building sufficient security forces and sufficient
ministerial administrative capacity (Dubik, 2009). It
takes much longer to build administrative and institutional norms and operational capacity for a ministry
than it does to create a battle-ready infantry battalion. There are four main purposes for a ministry of
defense: to structure the power relationships between
politically elected and appointed leadership and an
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armed force’s senior leadership; define, and establish
the responsibilities between civilian and uniformed
military service personnel; to maximize the effectiveness of the armed forces; and to ensure the efficient
use of resources across the security sector (Bruneau &
Tollefson, 2006, pp. 78-82). It is reasonable to infer that
institutionalizing relationships between the executive and legislative branches of government and key
procedures (i.e., grand strategy and doctrinal review,
budgeting, and oversight) will take longer than training tactical level units.
Economic Transitions.
The literature on economic transitions includes a
rich body of theoretical and empirical studies, but is
well beyond the scope of this paper. Transitional economics is actually considered by some economists as a
distinct topic that overlaps between broader subfields
of institutional economics and development economics (Roland, 2000; Todaro & Smith, 2009). Much of the
work on economic transitions centers on nations that
have experienced, or are simultaneously experiencing,
internal conflict and the social, political, and security
transitions described above.
In the more general, macro-economic sense, economic transitions have to do with the change and dynamics a nation experiences as its economic system
transforms, typically from a more centrally controlled
system toward a more liberal, open, market-based
economy. From this perspective, the most contested
aspect of transition is the speed at which the economy
liberalizes, which has generated debate among experts who either advocate shock therapy, in the form
of rapid and radical economic institutional reforms, or
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those who argue for a gradual approach to economic
liberalization (Popov, 2000).
However, in a post-conflict economic transition
the goals are more short-term and are typically focused on “a revival of economic growth and restoring the quality of life and per capita consumption to
pre-conflict levels as soon as possible” (Snodgrass,
2004, p. 260). Theory suggests that economic reforms
in post-conflict stabilization operations ought to follow a path toward market liberalization, but should
be implemented in three phases (pp. 260-262):
1. a financial stabilization phase that focuses on
drastically reducing inflation and increasing international trade through currency boards and assistance
with deficits;
2. a rehabilitation and reconstruction phase
centered on restoring and reopening infrastructure
to facilitate trade and training people in key development skills including economic and financial policy
management; and,
3. a more long-term, comprehensive development phase that increases capital, both human and
natural resources, but maintains adequate regulatory
mechanisms for sustained growth.
Despite this pragmatic approach, externally
planned economic transitions can be equally problematic. David (1999, pp. 35-36) notes three major dilemmas:
1. the forced economic liberalization and introduction of competition typical of capitalist markets
can have an adverse effect on social inequalities and
fuel tensions;
2. humanitarian and other forms of external assistance are essential to economic development, but
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also hold great potential for creating local dependencies and become counterproductive to goals of local
sustainability, legitimacy, and ownership; and,
3. well-intended international organizations
such as the UN, the World Bank, and the International
Monetary Fund have a tendency to implement economic and security programs with objectives that run
counter to each other by taking different approaches
(e.g., top-down versus bottom up).
Nevertheless, economists have argued that economic transitions hinge more upon effective institutions and the rule of law, than the type of regime
(e.g. democratic versus authoritarian). Economic “liberalization alone, when it is not complemented with
strong institutions, cannot ensure good performance
. . . institutional capacities in turn, depend to a large
extent on the combination of the rule of law and democracy: the data seem to suggest that both—authoritarian and democratic regimes with the strong rule of
law can deliver efficient institutions” (Popov, 2000,
p. 44). China, the world’s second largest economy, is
the clearest example of an authoritarian regime with
a strong economy, strong institutions, and the rule of
law, providing much of the same support for economic
transitions as its democratic counterparts. At the very
least, this provides support to the claim that political,
security, and economic transitions are strongly interdependent.
Crosscutting Studies.
The authors note that there are several studies
that purposefully tackle transitional aspects of stability operations, but this area is still in need of greater
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scholarly focus and research. Mentioned several times
above, Charles-Philippe David (1999) explicitly notes
the simultaneity of security, political, and socioeconomic transitions. Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction, authored by USIP and PKSOI
(2009), is perhaps the most useful guide in gaining
an appreciation for the multiinstitutional and transitional aspects of stability operations. It indirectly, if
not directly, covers each of the domestic level transitions (political, societal, security, and economic) and
recognizes the complexities and dilemmas between
them. Haggard and Kaufman (1997) look at how economic performance influences democratic transitional
outcomes, specifically constitutional rules, political
alignments, and institutions. Kotze and Toit (1995)
explore the linkage between a robust civil society and
democratic transitions in South Africa, demonstrating
that the calming of societal tensions in deeply divided
societies tends to lag behind constitutional and institutional reforms during transition. Using Taiwan as a
case study, Lin et al. (1996) shows that displacement of
power and the realignment among the political elites
can be a positive development for political transitions
in countries with strong national identities and socioeconomic justice.
There are several monographs and edited volumes
that recognize the interdisciplinary and multi-institutional nature of stability operations and state-building
(Berdal, 2009; C. Call et al., 2008; Fukuyama, 2004;
Ghani & Lockhart, 2008; Paris, 2004; Paris & Sisk,
2009; Rotberg, 2004b). However, these works do not
directly focus on the transitional aspects of building
institutions and do not provide additional information to this study.
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Transitions do not occur in isolation within institutional boundaries. In other words, a war-to-peace
transition does not occur without changes in security
and politics. Rather, transitions occur simultaneously
and are inherently interdependent. Future research on
transitions should strive for a greater understanding
of the complexities between multiple transitions.
APPROACHES TO TRANSITION
Stability operations are inherently about transitions, encompassing the contextual and functional
roles in stabilization activities. While doctrine and
best practices/lessons learned are provided to guide
practitioners in the field, little exists to help individuals foster transition in these complex environments.
As the need for concrete strategies to address issues
of transition persists, government agencies and independent think tanks have created their own sets
of procedures, guidelines, and assessment tools to
grapple with issues that inform the many meanings
of transition. Yet, similar to the different definitions
presented in this literature review, the mechanisms
used to stimulate and measure transition correspond
to the level of response—whether tactical, operational,
or strategic.
Whole of Government Approach.
As one of the most popular strategic approaches to
transition, the whole of government (WOG) approach
encompasses the multiple stream method to measure
the concept (Bush, 2005; Nixon & Ponzio, 2007; PKSOI, 2007; Serafino, 2009; Szayna et al., 2009; U.S. Department of Defense, 2005a; U.S. Department of State
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- S/CRS, 2005b; U.S. Department of State, 2009; U.S.
Department of State & U.S. Department of Defense,
2009; U.S. Department of the Army, 2009a). The WOG
approach relies on the collaborative efforts of agencies
dealing with defense, diplomacy, and development
specifically related to stability operations in order to
address the mechanisms of governance, all affected
by transition. Brokered by the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), the WOG approach is meant to provide both military and civilian
support to issues dealing with the transition of fragile
states to more stable forms of governance.
The WOG approach tries to combine the functions of multiple government agencies supporting
transition initiatives to provide common definitions,
frameworks, and procedures at the strategic level.
This common framework assists U.S. Government
(USG) agencies in planning operational and tactical
activities that complement overall strategic goals. The
WOG approach is run through interagency working
groups and civil-military operations centers (CMOCs)
to decipher and address transitional issues that span
civil and military realms of authority. This multidisciplinary approach provides a more encompassing
mechanism to deal with complexity in transitional issues. While the WOG process is still being developed,
the hope is that a greater spectrum of capabilities will
be able to inform doctrine and strategy related to transition. The top-down approach of WOG provides the
backbone for streamlining processes in stabilization
initiatives to better achieve strategic goals through the
use of specific operational tools that vary by agency.
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Mentoring and Advising.
At tactical and operational levels, mentoring and
advising is used to create the leadership and capabilities needed to support transition activities. Several government agencies, most prominently the
U.S. military, have used mentoring and advising as a
staple to ensure that host nation authorities are both
able and willing to support transition, most specifically in security and governance functions (Brinkerhoff et al., 2009; Dubik, 2009; Durch, 2008a; Hadaway,
2009; Lauria; Leika, 2007; Miklaucic, 2009; Nagl, 2008;
Netherlands Ministry of Defence, 2008; PKSOI, 2009b;
Rubinstein et al., 2008; U.S. Department of the Army,
2009a). Provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) and
military transition teams (MiTTs) are most notable in
this endeavor, as groups work to stabilize environments through quick impact projects and one-on-one
interaction with host nation entities to teach them how
to sustain long-term benefits of stabilization aid. By
integrating all the tools of the USG—now referred to
as “smart power”—PRTs, MiTTs, and similar groups
are able to more aptly address the complex dynamics
of transition.
The military plays a prominent role in the mentoring/advising strategy in transition missions. Civil
Affairs (CA) components of the military can greatly
add to sector expertise and provide mentor support to
host nation nationals by matching military forces with
particular skill sets and capabilities to their respective
host nation counterparts. This greatly adds to the capability for stabilization components to create credible and capable leaders for transition while building
the potential to sustain institutions. CA plays a very
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important role in bolstering this aspect of stability operations, since it provides expertise to stability situations that lack adequate civilian input or capabilities
to mentor the host nation. Despite the WOG approach
discussed earlier in the paper, CA and other military
personnel often address discrepancies when WOG
approaches do not work or exist to deal with transition. Lack of holistic effort is less prevalent among
multilateral partners, who can sometimes provide just
as much or better civilian expertise to stability operations than military forces to deal with integrated civilian and military matters.
Comprehensive Approach.
Similar to the WOG approach, the comprehensive
approach focuses on the capabilities of partners and
allies to augment whole of government support in operations dealing with transition (Bellamy & Williams,
2005; Bobrow & Boyer, 1997; Campbell, 2008; Durch,
2008a; Fishman, 1990; Gow, 2009; B. Jones et al., 2009;
Krasner, 2004; Leika, 2007; Netherlands Ministry of
Defence, 2008; Nixon & Ponzio, 2007; Rubinstein et al.,
2008; Schnaubelt, 2009; U.S. Department of Defense,
2003; U.S. Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory,
2008a; Wittkopf, 1994). The comprehensive approach
spans all three levels of collaboration (tactical, operational, and strategic), but is most concentrated at operational and tactical levels; this results from a common
inability to form consensus on multinational strategic
goals. Past stability operations prove that partner
and ally support are crucial in providing unique skill
sets to transitional mechanisms. By promoting an approach that focuses not only on USG capabilities, but
also the unique skill sets of other international actors,
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coalitions can better address the complexities of transition at some of the most critical operating levels.
The comprehensive approach to transition is exemplified through NATO-led PRTs in Afghanistan.
Although PRTs were originally an American concept, other NATO allies quickly latched on to this
structure to capitalize on particular civil strengths for
reconstruction and stabilization activities, with the
benefit of having the military provide security. Independently run PRTs have become staples in some
regions by ensuring security while providing key
services and training promoting transition to more
stable and effective phases. Each PRT runs different
stability programs, reflective of the strategic goals of
the implementing country. Countries that actively
participate in PRTs often provide expertise based on
their capabilities; for some, civilian expertise is far
more advanced to provide support to stabilization activities as compared to military components. Despite
the personnel differences, comprehensive approaches
provide a single guide to all elements of stabilization
initiatives, creating operational support that draws on
the best characteristics of each actor.
The comprehensive approach to transition is
meant to further expand on the WOG approach presented above, but on an international level. While
both approaches are optimistic in the ability to combine civilian and military forces to achieve a state of
transition, the difficulties in pursuing this approach
are substantial. Unity of command and combined efforts are often obstacles in achieving a comprehensive
approach to transition initiatives, especially since
different bureaucratic structures compete for influence of missions and overall strategy; this is further
compounded by governing forces that sometimes
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advocate differing approaches to transition activities.
Competition over resources and command authority
can greatly inhibit the effectiveness of these types of
operations, especially if no strategic plan for transition is adequately created for planners. In effect, the
comprehensive approach is the most apt to encounter
problems in planning for and executing transitional
activities, and is most often effective only at the operational and tactical levels.
Counterinsurgency (COIN) Approach.
Counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy uses transition as a key component of its three-prong approach
to attaining stability in insurgencies (S. G. Jones, 2008;
U.S. Department of Defense, 2009a, 2009b; U.S. Department of State, 2009; U.S. Department of State &
U.S. Department of Defense, 2009; U.S. Department
of the Army, 2009b; U.S. Marine Corps Warfighting
Laboratory, 2009). As part of the “clear-hold-build”
strategy outlined in U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24,
Counterinsurgency, transition is both an end-state and
a process that is achieved through carefully crafted
strategy and tactics to defeat insurgent groups who
threaten the establishment of a viable and legitimate
national government (U.S. Department of the Army,
2009b). Maintaining unity of effort is a key part of successful transition, as COIN initiatives gain support
and legitimacy from the population, thus creating a
baseline for effective, and preferred, host nation institutions to grow.
The COIN approach to transition assumes that all
components of the strategy are integrated and calibrated at the national level to provide, and eventually transfer, essential services to the host nation. All
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USG agencies play important roles in the execution of
COIN, providing expertise in both civilian and military functions to the host nation. However, unlike the
strategy outlined in the WOG and comprehensive approaches, transition is the key goal or end state in any
stabilization activity since COIN seeks to build host
nation capacities for long-term sustainability—especially in policies that parallel USG goals. Host nation
institutions and leaders are the critical nodes ensuring
that transition initiatives are capable of succeeding in
post-conflict environments. Transition is, in effect, the
desired end goal for any COIN operation, making it
inherently strategic in its outlook and execution.
Developmental Transition.
Despite the emphasis on military transitions, the
foreign aid community uses transition as a key indicator of success for development and aid programs
(Cliffe et al., 2003; Crane et al., 2009; Crichton, 2009;
Feng & Zak, 1999; Frumin, 2009; Moon, 2009; PKSOI,
2009a; U.S. Agency for International Development
[USAID], 2009). Foreign aid success is highly dependent on its ability to change or alter conditions on the
ground, especially in conjunction with agency goals
and desired outcomes in stabilizing environments.
Transitions establish a benchmark for the aid community as to when to begin projects that bolster stabilizing societies, as well as the appropriate time to alter
programs to meet changing societal needs. In many
respects, development approaches depend heavily on
phased transition in order to gauge the success and
usefulness of programs by assessing results at different stabilization levels and times.
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Developmental transitions are focused more on
the process and phasing of transitioning communities to more sustainable livelihoods than on transition
as a viable end-state. Often, the aid community likes
to ensure that the transition process is successfully
completed before discontinuing aid or implementing
more advanced programs for economic development.
USAID frequently refers to transition as the main period of concern for aid communities, especially since
transitional periods are considered highly destabilizing in post-conflict environments. Transition is
viewed more as an obstacle or window of opportunity to achieve development goals rather than a pure
process of change. Transitional periods are a starting
point for aid communities as they gauge how to handle complex issues endemic to stabilization initiatives.
The Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) at USAID
deals exclusively with this concept, pinpointing transitional periods that need assistance for development.
The organization’s flexible and adaptive planning
helps USAID tailor U.S. assistance in support of transitional initiatives primarily to accelerate the timeline
to achieve stability.
AVAILABLE TOOLS FOR TRANSITION
Both academics and practitioners have tried to
cope with transition issues by creating standards for
stability activities. The efforts to create viable tools—
in the form of metrics, indicators, guidebooks, and
field manuals—have contributed to available tools,
but often lack a solid base definition to substantiate
these projects. The measurements currently available
to stability operation practitioners individually span
the extent of transitional issues, but no single toolkit
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adequately encompasses all of the challenges inherent
to grappling with the concept’s complexity.
Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments.
The Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments
(MPICE) framework provides an outcome-based metric system that measures operational and strategic advancements in stabilization environments (Dziedzic,
Sotirin, & Agoglia, 2008). This framework is meant to
directly support the stated goals and initiatives of policy, specifically as outlined by individual policymakers
in the planning process. MPICE is a guidebook that is
used to tailor stability measures to specific strategic
goals, using a top-down approach to reach local level
actors in stabilizing environments.
MPICE uses both quantitative and qualitative
measures to indicate trends in stability indicators
throughout three key levels of stability building: imposed stability, assisted stability, and self-sustaining
peace. Each of these phases is marked by indicators or
concepts that address elements of the stability building process, mainly governance, cessation of violence,
and economic and social well-being. All of these indicators are considered transferrable to stability environments by being broad enough to adjust for cultural
and social uniqueness. General categories of MPICE
indicators facilitate individual application on the operational level, specifically to measure stability directly related to community indicators. For example, delivery of public goods and services may be measured
by quality of life perception and public satisfaction to
indicate the strength of this category (Dziedzic et al.,
2008). The change in these specific indicators, marked
by a “+” (indicating a positive trend), a “-” (indicating
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a negative trend), or a “d” (indicating condition dependent trends) is meant to measure the impact of
stabilization policies on diminishing short- and longterm threats.
MPICE provides insights in measuring transition
during stability operations. In one sense, it provides
strategic and operational guidance in the types of
characteristics to consider when assessing transition
policy effectiveness. This assumes that transition is
a phased process that can be achieved by changing
environmental trends, specifically those directly impacting the population. However, MPICE fails to look
beyond transition as something other than a phased
process of factors over a long time horizon. The transitional element of MPICE is barely measured by the
indicators because of their lack of proven causality.
Transition must first be understood before attempting
to measure it in variables which may exclude more
causal mechanisms of stability.
Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Task Matrix.
The U.S. Department of State (DoS) created the
Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Task Matrix as
a living document to capture some of the recurring
tasks in post-conflict operations. DoS implemented
this matrix, which was created in 2005, as a way to
better conceptualize the tactical missions feeding into
operational requirements for three key phases of postconflict transition: initial response, transformation,
and sustainability. The matrix is divided into particular operational areas (including security, governance
and participation, humanitarian assistance and social
well-being, economic stabilization and infrastructure,
and justice and reconciliation) that help divide tasks
according to goals at each of the three stages. The
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matrix is a check list for practitioners to match tactical
and operational goals with specific and defined activities.
The Essential Task Matrix is an extensive document embracing the dynamic complexity of transition,
mostly by covering a broad range of “transitional areas.” The Matrix covers topics ranging from elections
and establishing a judiciary to creating electrical grids
to hiring and training teachers for education. Many
of the tasks assume a direct relation to achieving a
higher level of stability—for example, elections will
lead to the new task of creating public offices. However, while the indicators are helpful to practitioners,
many are open to interpretation in both meaning and
operationalization depending on implementer experiences. Practitioners undertaking stability tasks act as
the arbiters during transitional planning, truly providing authority at the tactical level. This oversight
mechanism can result in either very complex planning
(if coordination and partnerships take place) or isolated planning (if the planner is focused on one or two
activities) that can affect how transition is handled in
these environments.
Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework.
The Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework
(ICAF) was created in 2004 in response to the United Nations (UN) Working Group on Transition. The
group, which analyzed the activities needed to secure
stability, provided several recommendations for coordinated planning and implementation. As followon action to several of these recommendations, the
USG determined that a common, planned interagency
mechanism was needed to address issues affecting
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fragile states. The working group specifically highlighted the necessity to create a common framework to
assess contextual factors of conflict mitigation. ICAF
provides this standardized analytical framework to
guide operational mechanisms and address the causes
of transition.
The ICAF uses a number of key assumptions in
guiding policymakers in the planning of stability operations. Specifically, the framework addresses the importance of transition in creating viable foundations
for authority transfer to host nation governments.
ICAF assumes:
1. Each transition is unique, so that the analysis
needs to be context-specific;
2. Conflicts are not mono-causal phenomena
and arise from a set of interconnected conflict factors
and dynamics;
3. Transition programming of the UN system
should aim at “doing no harm” and minimizing unintended negative impacts;
4. Transition programming of the UN system
should aim at maximizing its peace building impact in
the aftermath of the crisis, as well as over the longerterm;
5. Efforts should be made to ensure national
ownership and seek the participation of all conflict
parties in the process of the analysis (United Nations,
2004; 2).
In many respects, transition is used as an indicator
in this framework to measure conflict abatement strategy effectiveness. The use of transition as a benchmark in planning indicates its importance in stability
operation strategic goals—most notably by serving
as a concrete end-state. However, ICAF does not
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exclusively focus on the process of transition, but instead the mechanisms of collaboration and their effectiveness in addressing stabilization factors. The
ICAF critiques organizational mechanisms through
three key stages of the stabilization process: conflict,
ongoing responses, and strategic and programmatic
conclusions for transition planning. The ICAF intends
to unify not only agencies, but stages of the transition
process by feeding mechanisms into each other. Assessment of coordination is not rigidly separated by
the three stages, but instead impacts subsequent stages of the process.
The Sphere Project.
The Sphere Project evolved in 1997 from a group
of humanitarian nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) and the Red Cross/Red Crescent Society as a
way to standardize humanitarian responses to natural
disasters and conflict, explicitly drawing on the principles of the Humanitarian Charter. The first rendition
of the Sphere Project, launched in 2000, outlined five
key areas of humanitarian response: water supply and
sanitation, nutrition, food aid, shelter, and health services. A second Sphere Project manual was released in
2004 upon suggestions from the international community; the second edition includes a sixth sector—food
security.
The Sphere Project’s significance is based on the
NGO assertion that stability is progressed through
certain minimum standards. The six indication areas
provide benchmarks for achieving a stability baseline; this baseline demarcates the tipping point to
transition societies from danger to viability through
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the use of humanitarian aid. The Sphere handbook
places tremendous emphasis on host nation participation in planning and implementing disaster response
programs. The handbook uses tactical techniques to
achieve these transitional phases during periods of instability. The hands-on approach championed by the
literature is particularly informative, especially since
feedback from the host nation is essential to program
success. The Sphere Project provides insights into how
to achieve transition by incorporating the help of the
host nation in every aspect of the response process,
making responses truly organic and directly responsive to the situation.
Tactical Conflict Assessment Framework.
USAID and DoD created the Tactical Conflict Assessment Framework (TCAF) for use in stability environments, specifically on the tactical level. The TCAF
is a response to USAID observations that civilian and
military response team members had little guidance
for actions in stability operations. The TCAF provides
a basic framework of preliminary response mechanisms for these teams.
The TCAF is unique because of its tactical focus in
addressing causes of conflict and combines military
and civilian efforts into a single, standardized tool.
“The TCAF is a simple and standardized diagnostic
tool used to gather information from local inhabitants to identify the causes of instability or conflict in
a unit’s area of operation. This information can help
identify, prioritize, monitor, evaluate, and adjust civil-military programming targeted at diminishing the
causes of instability or conflict” in an area (USAID,
2010, p. 1). To accomplish this, the tool focuses on four
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key areas: (1) identifying the cause of instability, (2)
addressing the local context, (3) gathering information, and (4) designing programs that effectively address the situation. Each of these stages is reliant on
the direct interactions between local inhabitants and
tactical commanders to collect appropriate information for stability activities. Specifically, TCAF highlights the importance of informed tactical activities in
gauging and ensuring transition progress. It depends
highly on environmental factors and responses to provide accurate assessments of transition.
United Nations Transition Strategy.
The UN has been very proactive in writing best
practices and planning guidelines on transitional issues. Founded under the UN Development Group
(UNDG), the “UN Transition Strategy” refers to the
organization’s contingency response plans to conflict
situations. The UN is careful to make the distinction
that the transition strategy is not a long-term solution to managing conflict and instability; instead, it
is meant to bridge the gap between failing and sufficient responses to disaster by employing specific
stabilization tools. The transition strategy makes use
of extensive response networks to draw on the most
applicable services and activities to stabilize fragile
environments.
The UN developed the Working Group on Transitions to analyze and change UN responses to crises,
specifically by creating tools that more directly address stabilization. The Working Group pinpoints
specific transition indicators that help to better measure stability in conjunction with broader national
reconstruction goals. The Working Group depends
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highly on host nation capabilities to implement transition, using authority transfer as the primary goal of
stability plans to foster longer-term collaboration with
international actors. “The aim of the UN System in
transition should be to assist national authorities to
initiate immediate, priority crisis resolution and recovery actions, and to lay the ground work, including
the capacity, systems and relationships needed to embark on a longer term development path” (UN, 2007,
p. 1). In effect, the organization assists the host nation
in establishing the foundations to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the UN’s most
prominent international standards and goals.
The UNDG Toolkit is one of the most referenced
metrics for assessing and responding to conflict. The
Toolkit provides both step-by-step and work stream
prescriptions to guide practitioners in planning stability responses. While the indicators are specific in
which conditions UN actions address, the Toolkit is
meant to strategically guide the organization vis-à-vis
the host nation’s mandate and responsibilities. The
majority of work streams outlined in the Toolkit focus on joint capabilities that work hand-in-hand with
the host nation, including the provision of common
services, communication, budgetary framework, and
leadership. The implications for this type of collaboration are substantial: by relying on the host nation as
part of the planning and implementation process, the
host nation is held responsible for sustaining transitional conditions created by stability operations.
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Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and
Multinational Tools.
Recently, coordination for stability operations
across joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and
multinational lines has been a primary goal for policy
planners. As fragile states and governments become a
prominent concern for the international community,
states, government agencies, and partners must interact at the strategic level to determine the causes of,
and solutions to, instability using a multinational and
comprehensive approach. The U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) has taken the lead on exploring and
collaborating on ways to increase the effectiveness of
stability and reconstruction planning, specifically by
ameliorating some of the inhibitions of actors to work
in a multilateral environment.
The most prominent initiative launched by JFCOM
is the Multinational Experiment, which analyzes the
difficulties in collaborating across joint, interagency,
intergovernmental, and multinational boundaries.
This initiative, which brings together NATO officials
and representatives from more than 18 different countries, seeks to bridge the gap between individual country capabilities and collaborative styles to respond to
complex operating environments as a holistic community. As of 2009, six different experiments had been
conducted to review various warfighting capabilities
in response to many different threat environments.
JFCOM is prepared to continue these experiments to
cull more lessons from joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations, and address
strategic guidance for future stability operations. The
experiments are intended to create guidelines and
metrics for actors from all sectors of this collaborative
community.
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FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
On the whole, the academic research on transitions is broad and varies in depth along the lines of
the six types of transitions. By far, the democratic transitions literature provides the most depth of analysis
and employs the widest range of methodologies. The
academic research on transitions also tends to be compartmentalized within the six types of transitions. This
compartmentalization is a natural reflection of the disciplinary nature of social science research and existing research programs—international relations and
security studies, comparative politics, anthropology
and peace studies, and economics, for example. More
scholarly attention should be given specifically to the
topic of security transitions as much of the present research focuses on broad lessons learned and prescriptive aspects of security sector reform. Little is understood about sequencing aspects of security transition
beyond macro, institutional-level analyses. Even less
is known about thresholds and tipping points between
critical phases of stability operations or the degree of
resilience necessary to sustain institutional reforms in
the long term. Also, due to the often-noted complexity and indeterminacy of transitions in general, more
research exploring interactions across social, political, military, and economic institutions in transition
is needed as well. Certainly, all of these future areas of
research would be best addressed through an interdisciplinary approach.
We find that there is much to be gained from all
forms and methods of future inquiry (inductive generalizing vs. deductive particularizing and qualitative
vs. quantitative) on transitions. For those interested in
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pursuing more generalized knowledge, the literature
is full of case studies and edited volumes on countries,
conflicts, and specific aspects of transition, but no attempt has been made to squarely and systematically
address transition itself in stability operations across
a range of cases. Alexander George’s (2005) method
of “structured, focused comparison” which demands
researchers clearly define their research objective and
ask the same specific questions to standardize data collection and analysis would be an ideal approach. Once
a baseline program is established, more researchers
would be able to contribute and conduct cross-case
comparisons.
Likewise, more particularized, subjective-oriented
methods of research (i.e., content and document analysis, ethnography, interviews, and focus groups) will
add depth and richer understanding of the complex
nature of transitions, particularly with regard to the
gaps noted above. Practitioners often characterize
transition according to their own subjective experience. These experiences are shaped by their particularized location, role, and influence on stabilization
activities as well as the broader context of the stability
operation they operate within. Their experiences are
essential to capturing lessons learned and individualized explanations of transitions. However, because
these actors are often from other countries, their views
retain a degree of objectivity as they are outsiders and
thus have no ethnocentric bias. As such, researchers
must also seek out local actors in these operations.
While more difficult to access, members of critical institutions would provide important information that
will act as an important hedge against hidden assumptions and bias. Both sources of information (practitioner and indigenous) on transitions should be captured
in a systematic manner.
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Of the numerous tools available to policymakers
to measure and assess transition, no single tool fully
captures the dynamic nature of the concept. Many of
the measures are based on very narrow and concrete
definitions of transition that are often not applicable
to other actors undertaking similar or parallel activities. Often times, these tools intend to serve particular
goals of an agency rather than solve transitional issues
on a strategic and interagency level. More research
must be undertaken to test underlying assumptions
of presently popular transition indicators and explore
other potentially influential factors affecting transition. In addition, transition community actors should
collaborate on this pertinent topic to develop a more
comprehensive tool for stability actors.
CONCLUSION
Transition continues to be one of the most pervasive and elusive aspects of stability operations. There
is little question that the international community will
remain charged and challenged with the responsibility of stabilizing fragile states now and for the near
future. This will be true as long as post-conflict stability operations involve myriad actors and are each
unique in their specific and circumstantial complexity, and, most important, while they each share one
desired outcome: long-term stability. As academics
and practitioners alike wrestle with figuring out how
to achieve stability, the inherent transitional nature of
these operations will continue to be a burning question.
This monograph has provided an exhaustive catalog and assessment of the state of research and practice on transition as it relates to stability operations. It
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offers a rudimentary system of classification through
mapping characteristics (process, phasing, authority transfer, and end-state) and types of transitions
(war-to-peace, power, societal, political-democratic,
security, and economic) in the current literature. The
conceptual clarity and systematized focus areas that
such an endeavor provides will allow scholars and decisionmakers to think more concretely and critically
about all aspects of transition. Moreover, our definition of transition makes a significant and innovative
contribution to this field of research and ongoing
policy debates between joint, interagency, and multinational actors conducting stability operations and
evaluating roles and responsibilities abroad. While
this monograph has not evaluated specific hypotheses, explanations, or predictions on transitions in stabilization operations, it sufficiently carves out a line
of scholarly and professional inquiry and provides a
solid foundation for future research.
Academics and professionals have both the challenge and opportunity to improve how stability operations are conducted in the future. Transition is one
among many issue areas requiring more attention to
adequately confront this larger task. This work sheds
light on an often-imprecise subject matter. As the international community continues to rebuild fragile
states, it is our hope that the concepts outlined herein
contribute to an improved understanding and implementation of stability operations.
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